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ABSTRACT
Portraying matters as other than they truly are is an important
part of everyday human communication. In this paper, we
use a survey to examine ways in which people fabricate, omit
or alter the truth online. Many reasons are found, including
creative expression, hiding sensitive information, role-playing,
and avoiding harassment or discrimination. The results suggest
lying is often used for benign purposes, and we conclude that
its use may be essential to maintaining a humane online society.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
H.4 [Information Systems Applications]: Miscellaneous;
J.4 [Social and Behavioral Sciences]: Sociology
Keywords
Lying online; privacy; digital identity; online communities
1. INTRODUCTION
People avoid telling the“full, open, and honest truth” in many
situations, whether it involves simply the omission or falsifi-
cation of information, to more substantial forms of deception
and lying. Such behaviours have been shown to amount to, by
some accounts, nearly a third of offline interpersonal communica-
tions [14, 1]. As individuals increasingly manage multiple social
contexts of growing complexity in their daily lives, techniques are
required for navigating the interlocking and often antagonistic
demands placed on them. Examination of deceptive practices
has shown that they often serve as coping strategies for man-
aging and mitigating these complex social situations. Examples
of such reasons include protecting one or another’s reputation
or identity, such as to preserve particular relationships or ties,
avoiding confrontation, showing solidarity with another, covering
up accidental transgressions, among others [20, 9].
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As the prevalence of computationally mediated socialisation
increases, so does the need to understand the role and use of
lying and deception in online interaction, and to uncover the
kinds of social tensions and attendant complexities that arise
from the new social affordances that the Web provides [21].
People now conduct their interactions and curate their identities
across a large number of online spaces at a much larger scale,
whilst attempting to maintain their privacy, reputation and
roles throughout. Deception is a tool used to cope with this
complexity, and a lens through which their difficulties and needs
can be observered [20, 9].
In this paper, we present a summary of a survey-based study in
which we sought to characterise the spectrum of lying and decep-
tion practices routinely used online. We are concerned with the
ways in which people carry out the use of such behaviours, the
reasons for them, and the manners in which such practices arise
or are used differently across contexts, situations, and spaces.
We aimed this initial study at prolific internet users, who spend,
if not a majority, a substantial part of their daily lives in social en-
counters online, as being most socially engaged online and likely
to the widest variety of such behaviours. We are interested in the
intent behind the deception, but we do not examine the moral
or ethical dimensions of such practices, as these can be highly
subjective and grounded in particular personal philosophies.
As described in the following sections, our analysis found that
while there are a wide range of reasons people use deception or
identity protection online, few reasons for doing so are malicious
(or comprised of “dark lies”); in fact, a majority of the reasons
pertain to impression management, conflict avoidance, and in
order to fit in to groups. Prior to describing these findings, in the
following sections, we first briefly review the literature on online
deception and lying. Second, we briefly describe our method-
ology and present our results. In the final section, we discuss
the implications of our findings for the development of the Web,
in particular within the context of the increasing centralisation
of social networks and rise of web identity assurance providers.
2. BACKGROUND
While several detailed frameworks for characterising different
kinds of deception have been proposed in the social psychology
literature, the most common approach divides lies into two gen-
eral classes: everyday lies of “little consequence or regret”, and
serious lies, used typically to “hide transgressions”, ranging from
misdeeds to betrayals of trust [14]. These notions correspond to
the common distinction between harmless or beneficial white lies,
and socially or morally reproachable lies. A third category of
grey lies exists in between [10]. In order to characterise the moti-
vations behind lying, Buller and Burgoon derive three categories:
instrumental, relational, pertaining to interpersonal relations,
and identity-related, pertaining to reputation management [8].
A number of studies have compared online to offline lying
practices. When looking at the richness of communication
environments — the amount and immediacy of feedback for
participants — two competing theories arise. Media richness
theory postulates that lying is more likely in rich environments,
while social distance theory predicts more lying in impoverished
settings, with fewer social cues, such as via e-mail. Hancock
et al. [21] analyse this competition, and find support for the
latter in their experiments. Belkin et al. compared lying in
e-mail to paper, finding that people were likely to lie on e-mail
signficantly more than in personal letters [31].
Sherry Turkle’s seminal work on early digital spaces, Life on
the Screen [36], discusses the ways in which identity construction
is a creative act, and linked to self development. This desire to
choose how one presents has been confirmed by many studies
of online behaviour. For example, the frequency with which
gamers assume the opposite gender in online play [24, 32, 37],
assume widely different appearances in online virtual environ-
ments and massively multiplayer games [42], falsify age, height,
weight and appearances in online dating sites [22, 17], and ex-
periment with self-representation in online chat and discussion
spaces [16, 39, 38].
Most similar to the work presented in this paper, Caspi et
al. [11] conducted a Web survey of Israeli internet users and
found that, although a majority of participants believed that
deception on the Internet was widespread, only a third ever
reported using deception online themselves. Instead of open-
ended responses, however, their survey asked participants to
select among a fixed set of possible personal attributes (age, sex,
marital status, height, weight, etc.) and the reasons for doing so.
Our study complements theirs by providing a significantly larger
set of ways people use deception, omission and false attributes,
and justifications for doing each.
3. DESIGN AND METHOD
In this section, we describe the process used to design the
instrument we selected to elicit the online behaviours we wished
to study. We follow this discussion with a description of the
participant recruitment method, and method of data analysis
conducted.
3.1 Survey Design
Early on in the process, we postulated that eliciting the
breadth of behaviours we sought to understand – ranging from
trivial information omission and fabrication, to deliberate de-
ception and beyond – might be challenging for multiple reasons.
On the one hand, behaviours concerned with privacy and safety
are often carried out routinely, with benevolent (non-malicious)
intention. These kinds of well-ingrained practices might not
be reported as lying or deception, due to both their familiar-
ity and their motivation. At the opposite end of the scale,
morally reproachable, subversive or malicious practices may
not be reported because the person is not comfortable sharing,
whether to protect their reputation, their self image or for fear
of repercussions.
We addressed these risks by, first, looking for precedent in
previous surveys (e.g., the Questionnaire on Academic Excuses
Q4a* Have you ever told lies / “untruths” online? Why?
Q4b How often do you tell lies / “untruths” on social
media?
Q4c How often do you think your friends lie on social
media compared to you?
Q5a* Do you use any pseudonyms online? Why?
Q5b* Have you created any fictional personas? Why?
Figure 1: List of questions corresponding to subset of
survey discussed in this paper; questions with stars indi-
cate free response; the rest are 5-level Likert responses.
for student lying behaviour [33], elicitation method for daily
lying studies [14]) and second, iterating on the survey design
consulting other colleagues as experts in the process to shape
the specific foci and wordings of our questions. Since we could
find no survey that we could directly appropriate, we resorted
to designing our own1. In order to characterise the broad class
of behaviours we wanted to examine, we first showed a list of
candidate terms including terms such as deceptions, lies, falsifi-
cations, omissions and untruths to several experts, alongside a
small but diverse list of example behaviours we wished to seek.
Our colleagues, comprising 2 Web Science doctoral students
and 3 postdoctoral researchers, gave us feedback about which
term(s) they considered most appropriate, and then discussed
the range of behaviours we were seeking to elicit. The outcome
of this process was to break our three distinct questions: one
pertaining to the use of untruths, one pertaining to the use of
pseudonyms, and finally to the use of fictional personas, which
are identities for characters that were entirely fabricated.
The survey was delivered via the web, and comprised 12 sets
of questions including 1 set of demographic questions, and 8
open-answer free responses. In this paper, we focus on the
subset of the questionnaire delineated in Figure 1.
3.2 Participant Recruitment
The survey was published online, with no restrictions on par-
ticipation. General recruitment was carried out by handing out
flyers with the URL, and the researcher’s social media presences
(primarily Facebook and Twitter). This was augmented by
enlisting two people with popular twitter accounts (@TheTom-
Ska, 191k followers, and @DameWendyDBE, 4k followers) to
promote the survey. In order to ensure a good selection of
passionate internet users – people who live a lot of their life
on the web, and care about their online presence – additional
recruitment was carried out in person at two events in London:
ComicCon and the WebWeWant Festival.
3.3 Analysis
Analysis of free-response questions was done using a grounded
theory [35] approach; themes were identified across responses
through a process starting with open coding process by each
of three researchers separately, followed by a discussion process
where themes were refined and combined. Multiple themes were
permitted per entry. Once consensus was achieved on themes, all
responses for a given question were re-coded against the final set.
4. RESULTS
1We initially considered several methods besides survey, includ-
ing semi-structured interviews, and artefact examinations, but
fell back to a web-based survey to be the most appropriate for get-
ting a wide sample from a large number of our target population.
(a) Facebook (b) Twitter
(c) YouTube (d) Tumblr
(e) Instagram (f) Vine
Figure 2: Self-reported use of social media, from
1=Never to 5=Often times a day. Medians:
facebook = 3, twitter = 5, Y ouTube = 5, Tumblr = 3,
Instagram=2, V ine=1
Out of the N=500 survey responses, 39% (N=198) provided
a gender; 50.2% responded female, 49.8% male, and 1% trans-
gender. With respect to age, 59% responded, 91% were between
18–25, 7% between 26–35, and 2% 36+. The age distribution
skew was reflective of, and likely due primarily to, the pre-
dominantly young audiences at the two festivals; we discuss the
potential implications of this distribution at the end of the paper.
Nearly all respondents were very active social media users,
although use of particular platforms varied significantly. Figure
2 shows the self-reported Likert scores per platform for 6 social
media platforms. The popularity of YouTube and Twitter for
respondents was likely influenced by the method of recruitment
(via Twitter), and the fact that one of the popular Twitter
users who disseminated news of the survey is a popular YouTu-
ber. The other platforms, meanwhile, were more divided, with
Tumblr being the most divided between highly active (N=125,
27%) and those that never used it (N=144, 32%). Vine was
reported used the least overall with (N = 422,91%) reporting
having either never or rarely used it.
4.1 Self-reported frequency of deception/lying
In terms of frequency of lying, 77% of participants (N=387)
responded to Q4b, How often do you lie on social media? the
distribution of answers is is displayed in Figure 3a. The median
response was 2, with a majority (N =330, 85%) of responses
answering either a 1 or 2.
Question 4c asked How often do you think your friends lie
on social media compared to you?, and 77% (N = 386) again
responded overall (Figure 3b). The median value was 3, with
a) I lie b) My friends lie
1
2
3
4
5
0 50 100 150 0 50 100 150
Figure 3: Responses to Q4b and Q4c on Likert scales
a) How often do you tell lies or untruths on social
media? (1=Never to 5=Often) b) How often do you
think your friends lie on social media compared to you?
(1=Vastly less to 5=Vastly more)
(N=87, 22%) responding with a value that their friends lie less
than they do (e.g. 1 or 2), while (N=119, 30%) responded that
their friends lie more (e.g. 4 or 5).
4.2 Reasons for Deception
A total of N = 134 responses were received for q4, which
asked people to explain whether they remembered telling lies (or
“untruths”) online and to explain the circumstances. Out of the
total respondents a quarter (N=34, 25%) answered that they
had or did not lie or use any form of deception online. The rest
of the respondents admitted to having, or performing some form
of deception regularly. Thematic coding of the remainder of the
responses revealed 10 themes, listed in Figure 4, plus an extra for
yes, a category standing for responses admitting participating
in deception with no explanation, and no for responses that
denied using deception on social media. Tagging each response
with the themes yielded M=1.08 themes per category, with a
minimum of 1 and maximum of 3 (σ2 =0.3). The number of
responses falling into each of the themes is visible in Figure 4
(again, a response may be assigned to more than one theme).
The most prominent theme was playup (N=35), which cor-
responded to the rationale of wanting to be more appealing,
interesting or attractive to others. There were several subtypes
of this activity, starting with simply falsifying personal attributes
(height, weight, age) towards what s/he perceived would make
him or her more attractive, to exaggerating details of stories, to
making things “seem relatable”. Four mentioned aspects relat-
ing to making one’s self seem popular or important by filling
his or her social calendar to appear busy, while two discussed
fabricating stories, such as of having met celebrities. Contexts
ranged from online dating to social interaction with strangers.
Far less common (N = 9, 7%) was the opposite reason, in
which participants reported deliberately distorting or omitting
information in order to not attract attention or in many cases
to prevent disclosure of illness or situation to protect one’s repu-
tation. This theme, coded as playdown, included the following
responses:
(R354) Lied about my mental health countless times, denied
depression and suicidal thoughts.
(R461) I very selectively curate my online personae, particu-
larly on Facebook, where I am careful to hide my men-
tal illness, my frustrations, and my negative emotions.
(R49) I tend to lie about how sick I am so people don’t
worry/employers don’t get anxious.
The second most prominent theme after playup was pri-
vacy, a theme used to encompass a variety of privacy related
yes
playup
creative
privacy
playdown
conform
system
mitigate
explore
coherence
safety
soceng
To experiment with altering aspects of
identity to explore effects on
interactions
To backing up lies told elsewhere
To trick people, falsely gaining trust
to achieve some goal
To protect self
Hacking the system − extra accounts,
circumventing age restrictions
Escape or end awkward or difficult
interactions, politeness, butler lies
"to mess with people", fun,
entertainment, humour, boredom.
To make seem less significant, e.g.
stop people from worrying
To omit, distort or falsify to blend in
with others
Do lie, but without explanation
To preserve privacy or prevent identity
linkage
To exaggerate, fabricate, falsify, or
embellish to enhance image
0 10 20 30
Figure 4: Tags and counts for responses to Question
4: Have you ever told “untruths” on social media, given
fictitious info, omitted or distorted the truth online?.
concerns. Respondents reported explicitly withholding informa-
tion often, and, where information was required, providing false
values about themselves. The attributes most often mentioned
were age (N=17), real name (N=13), physical location (N=6),
gender (N=3) and birth date (N=2) to web sites that they
did not trust. Four mentioned that this in order to prevent
identity linkage to their real-world identities, e.g.:
(R461) On fetish sites, I will lie about my birthday (displacing
my age by a few months to a year in the process) and
my hometown, making my identity there harder to
connect to my real identity.
Others expressed that they adopted the strategy of falsifying
attributes when social networks asked for information that were
unnecessary, for example:
(R500) Whenever a social media asks me to provide personal
details which are not directly necessary for them
to deliver the service (e.g. Facebook asking for my
workplace), I constantly feed them wrong information.
First and foremost to stop them asking me for such
information while at the same time keeping my
personal data private.
A different reason given for falsified attributes was coded
as conform, when falsification was done in order to fit in, in
particular to avoid harassment and discrimination. Such be-
haviour including avoiding potential confrontation surrounding
personal beliefs (pertaining to religion or politics), or to per-
sonal attributes including gender, age, race or sexual orientation.
One participant described her choice of declaring herself as
male improved her position in debates online which were often
predicated with ad feminam attacks on her gender:
(R301) The major untruth I tell is pretending to be a man
rather than a woman on YouTube - I know it’s bad and
not helping the cause, but I know that if I want to con-
vince someone of a particular point, if I pretend to be a
man my sayings won’t be regarded through the bias of
my gender, while if I say opinions (completely discon-
nected from gender issues) as a woman, it will probably
be the 1st thing my opponents will use in a debate.
Another set of responses (N=6) involve tricking the system
in some way (system), predominantly falsification of age in
order to circumvent controls on age-restricted websites.
A smaller category (N = 6) corresponded to deception or
lies told for fun, humour, or “just messing about”. The tag
creative was used for this group, which included examples such
as pretending to have a twin, pretending to have met someone
famous, or permuting another person’s words.
Lies used to diffuse, or bring an end to, unwanted social sit-
uations we called mitigate. This class (N=7) was a superset
of butler lies, while butler lies serve primarily to terminate and
divert unwanted social interactions, the lies in this category
included those told to be polite, such as agreeing with a person
to avoid an argument. Meanwhile, safety (N=3) corresponded
to the responses describing omission or falsification to avoid
compromising one’s physical safety, or from potential litigation
for potentially illegal activities.
Some users described the use of deception in order to deceive,
trick or manipulate situations to the individual’s advantage;
such reasons were coded soceng (N =2) because it reflected
the common notion of “social engineering”. These responses de-
scribed falsification of academic credentials for jobs and posing as
another person online and attempting to attract her partner’s at-
tentions as this fake identity in order to test her partner’s loyalty.
Finally, explore, and coherence each had two responses.
The first, explore, pertained to responses that discussed exper-
imenting with aspects of their identity, in particular to “test the
reactions of others”, a category corresponding to the tag experi-
ment for q5, as described in the next section. Meanwhile, coher-
ence was the act of lying in order to maintain consistency with
other lies told elsewhere to prevent lies from being discovered.
4.3 Pseudonyms
A total of N = 286 responses were received for q5a, which
asked for information about whether participants had used
pseudonyms, and why. A group (N = 82,27%) claimed not
to use pseudonyms online, and a further group (N = 5,2%)
gave answers which were unclear. This left 70% of respondents
claiming to have used an online pseudonym.
The most common reason for pseudonym use was tagged as
separation (N=63,22%). This covers several different lines of
division. The three most prevalent reasons were i) separating
online and offline lives; ii) separating personal and professional
identities; and iii) maintaining distinction between groups of
friends or family:
(R266) . . . It was mainly done to slightly separate my identity
from reality and the internet.
(R79) . . . I also do not want future employers and such to
be able to find all of my social media straight away
and making judgements based on it.
(R150) . . . I used to have a nerdy YouTube channel which I
did not want my peers finding out about, so almost
all of my online activity connected to that was under
a different (screen) name
discrimination
safety
separation
privacy
reuse
yes
conform
discoverability
identity
intimate
expression
nothide
disnomia
spy
plus
bespoke
hide
creative
habit
system
sex
Avoid being judged unfairly.
Anything about sex.
Posting intimate thoughts and feelings.
Dislike real name.
Mentioned the Google+ ‘‘real names'' policy.
Several online identities kept separate.
Hacking the system − extra accounts,
circumventing age restrictions
Online identity more closely matching true
self.
The system is spying on me, merging my
accounts, and sharing data.
Conform to community norms, fit in with
others.
Hiding activities from everyone.
For entertainment or creative purposes.
Saying things without fear or repercussions.
Used a nickname or variation of offline
names.
Force of habit.
Use of a pseudonym, but not trying to hide
one's identity.
Use of a pseudonym to connect identities or
be discoverable.
Protection from other people.
"Yes", with no reason given.
General feeling of not wanting to reveal
stuff.
Separate concerns (professional, family,
between friends).
0 20 40 60
Figure 5: Pseudonyms — Tags and counts (N = 286)
for responses to Question 5a: Do you use pseudonyms
on any social media platforms? Responses which were
in the negative or unclear have been removed.
Related to separation, several people used pseudonyms to
hide (N=8) their activities online. This is distinct as it covers
activities that they would like no-one to know about, rather
than seeking to separate different identities. Most commonly,
this had to do with pornography:
(R183) Yes, especially when using pornographic sites such as
Chaturbate.
However, there were also examples of more general hiding:
(R398) I have to do things that people don’t need to know
about but I don’t hide my real persona
Ignoring the ‘yes’ answers, the next most common reasons
were privacy and safety; while these codes are related, there
are some distinctions in the meanings we found. safety (N=22)
related to a fear of repercussions spilling out of that particular on-
line world. Some of these threats were specific ideas of violence:
(R168) As a person on the internet with (rather unpopular)
opinions I find myself constantly subjected to pretty
severe harassment such as very graphic rape and
death threats, so I feel it would be safer to reveal little
to no identifying information on certain platforms.
Many people were concerned about the idea of being stalked,
of what might happen if people could find them ‘in real life’,
while others had a general sense that one should be safe or
careful online:
(R184) Yes, I do, because I am concerned that people might
stalk me if they know my real name.
(R169) . . . tends to involve a lot of total strangers, so I feel
I need to be more careful.
This is distinct from the responses concerned with a more
general notion of privacy (N = 36). This code was used for
responses which simply mentioned privacy, or a desire for one’s
data not to be shared. This ranged from a passive sense of
not wanting to share more than necessary to an active, explicit
desire to maintain privacy:
(R151) . . . I just don’t feel the need to have that info on there
at the moment . . .
(R241) I use pseudonyms to maintain privacy and also to
[The response cuts off here. The authors are intrigued
as to what was coming next.]
Some users were also change names in order to reduce the abil-
ity of systems to spy on them, or share their data unnecessarily
(N=4).
Not all uses of pseudonyms related to hiding or privacy.
A significant number of people (nothide, N = 15) explicitly
stated that they were not using a pseudonym in an attempt to
hide, while several carried on using pseudonyms out of habit
(N=10).
(R383) I use pseudonyms because they’re fun, I don’t use
them to hide my identity, I’m not batman.
A slightly larger number (N=18) used the pseudonyms to aid
in their discoverability, by having a common name across sev-
eral platforms, or to conform to the norms of the community
(N=6). Similarly, several people (N=10) reused real-world
identities, often in order to allow people they know offline to find
them. There is often an exclusive component to these responses,
that only the desired set of people will be able to find them:
(R223) Normally just a username which is based on my real
name because if you know me then you will know it
is me otherwise you would not
People also used pseudonyms to support creative activi-
ties, or simply for amusement (N=8). They also allowed the
expression of parts of their personality without fear of reper-
cussions (N=9), sharing of intimate content (N=3), and a
presentation closer to their internal identity:
(R44) I really identify as a guy, so I go by a male name.
Nobody IRL knows about that though. I do this
cause I just want to be... Who I really am inside?
Cheesy, but true.
Some people (N = 3) had a dislike of their civil name, and
simply wanted a change, or had a desire to create bespoke
identities for certain activities (N=3).
Finally, a few people used pseudoynms in order to have mul-
tiple accounts to manipulate the sociotechnological system
(N=3) – avoiding copyright issues, or tracking who sends spam
mails. One person created a pseudonym to escape discrimina-
tion, one in the pursuit of sex, and three people explicitly men-
tioned Google+’s insistence on real names or merging accounts.
4.4 Personas
A total of N=267 responses were received for q5b, in which
participants were asked if and why they had created any fictional
personas for use on social media. 65% reported that they do not
creative
character
yes
privacy
experiment
separation
soceng
spy
system
bespoke
identity
habit
discoverability
conform
expression
plus
sex
The system is spying on me, merging my
accounts, and sharing data.
Several online identities kept separate.
Online identity more closely matching true
self.
Force of habit.
Mentioned the Google+ ‘‘real names'' policy.
Anything about sex.
Hacking the system − extra accounts,
circumventing age restrictions
Use of a pseudonym to connect identities or
be discoverable.
Conform to community norms, fit in with
others.
General feeling of not wanting to reveal
stuff.
Tricking people to gain trust or manipulate
social situations
Saying things without fear or repercussions.
"Yes", with no reason given.
Separate concerns (professional, family,
between friends).
Role−playing identities to experience
treatment or viewpoint of others.
Role−playing an obviously fictional
character.
For entertainment or creative purposes.
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Figure 6: Personas — Tags and counts (N = 267)
for responses to Question 5b: “Have you created
any fictional personas (e.g., characters, alter-egos) to
use on social media?”. Responses which were in the
negative or unclear have been removed.
or never have; 5% responded in an unclear manner or described
pseudonyms rather than personas. Of the remaining third, the
most common reason was for creative purposes (N=21), in-
cluding to entertain themselves or others. Related to this are
those who explicitly state they’re role-playing a fictional char-
acter (N=11) and those creating bespoke identities (N=1).
(R44) I just role-play characters I like to escape from my
everyday hell hole.
(R256) I use another persona to have fun telling fictional
stories.
(R443) I have a blog that I update in the voice of a character
but thats for my own personal use as it’s helping me
to write a book
(R449) I have and i did it because i created a fictional
character and i wanted to give the illusion that the
character was real
(R482) I did so to make fun of some naive friends on a
facebook group.
The next most common response (N=10) was to experiment,
including testing the reactions of others to different ages, genders
or political views, or for self-exploration.
(R112) I use to when I was younger on tchat to see How
people talk to different kind of people (male, female,
younger, older etc...)
(R303) yes. many... i do this to role play different personalities
online and sometimes learn more about my actual
persona by doing so. i like the act.
(R461) ...I have created two alter-egos. One was a short-lived
novelty account that posted in the voice of a fictional
character, while the other is a member of a hate group
whom I used as a kind of psychological experiment in
empathy–by performing as a member of that group, I
came to a fuller understanding of what compels their
bigotry.
N = 8 responses were tagged with separation, where re-
spondents created personas to separate work and social lives or
posting of different content types.
(R381) Yes, to comment on Youtube, because I don’t want
Google+ on my regular upload account.
(R444) i’ve got accounts to post on when i feel annoyed so
that friends/family dont see and it doesnt affect their
impression of me
(R492) Yes, I have 2 different twitter accounts that I use,
one for general Fan base use which I am an overactive
mad sloth and one which is for school people to think
is my only one
Some users took on pseudonyms for privacy (N=3) or to
aid their self expression (N = 3) finding it gave them the
power to give voice to parts of their personality:
(R371) Yes, it helps me be more confident and say things to
people that I would otherwise be unable to say.
Social engineering was also a motivation (soceng, N = 3),
typically pretending to be someone new to gain trust or find
out people’s private opinions:
(R473) I once created a fake persona to ingratiate myself
with an online community and see what they were
saying about me in private.
Finally there was one respondent with each of the following mo-
tivations: resistance to the system spying on them, or explicitly
fighting the Google+ real names policy (plus); force of habit;
presenting an identity closer to their ‘true self’; and for sex.
5. DISCUSSION
Examining themes common to all of the questions we analysed,
several could be considered reflections of offline social practices.
Impression management behaviours such as playup, conform
and mitigate commonly occur in day-to-day life. The online
performances aimed at impressing friends and attempting to
diffuse awkward social encounters seemed largely analogous with
their face-to-face equivalents.
Similarly, a number of participants attempted to playdown
or not disclose problems they were having – they described their
motivations as not wanting to worry others, or not wanting
employers to find out. These participants are essentially using
lying to manage how others perceive them, effectively giving
them more control over their illnesses, rather than being forced
to disclose them, and having to deal with potential consequences
of that disclosure. This particular use goes beyond the butler lies
phenomenon discussed previously, and instead enables control
of psychological projection and public perception of self online.
Pseudonyms and personas, meanwhile, were commonly used
as mechanisms for preventing context collapse [23, 2, 30], main-
taining a separation of concerns between different facets of
respondent’s lives. Identity was partitioned based on both the
content posted and the intended audience. This included having
separate Twitter accounts for personal vs. professional posts;
‘secret’ accounts used to interact with fandom communities
away from the judgemental eyes of peers; and pseudonymous
Tumblrs which allow the solicitation of advice from strangers
regarding their non-parent-friendly intimate secrets. Consis-
tent pseudonyms were reported as useful for allowing those in
the know to track them across platforms (discoverability), or
link certain aspects of their persona together whilst excluding
others, without requiring the sharing of any personal details.
Whilst most people are told from a young age not to talk
to strangers in the street, the even more uncertain nature of
the audience of online interactions seem to make many of our
respondents innately wary. Altering or omitting personal details
was considered ‘the done thing’ by many, who either feared for
their physical safety or just wanted to avoid nasty comments.
Some had a sense that they would be stalked by strangers if
they revealed their location, regardless of whether or not they
considered their online activities provocative.
Lies in the form of impersonations, parodies, role-playing, or
storytelling were used creatively to entertain others and allevi-
ate boredom—just as joking around in person would do. The
behaviours reported are extensions of ways in which people
construct the multiple facets of their identity offline. This is
consistent with findings reported by boyd following ten years of
ethnographic studies of social media use by teenagers [3], that
the primary attraction of social media to young people is the
ability to claim a social space of their own, in which they can
‘hang out’ when restricted from being physically co-located with
their peers. boyd argues that privacy norms have not changed
as technology executives like Eric Schmidt and Mark Zuckerberg
would have us believe, but rather young people are continuously
evolving new ways to maintain much-desired control over social
situations [3, 25].
Some of the reported behaviours serve to highlight differences
between online and offline practices. While role-playing is used
in the real world in order to help people work through diffi-
cult or novel situations, the malleability of identity on social
networks enables participants a greater control over how they
present. This allowed several people to put themselves in the
shoes of others, to experience the treatment given to women,
or the feeling of being part of a hate group. In these cases, the
intention was clearly to deceive others, in order to get a ‘realistic’
experience, although the deception was carried out for seemingly
benign purposes. In addition, a small number of respondents
reported being able to project their true selves online in a way
that they cannot elsewhere. Others could alter their identity to
avoid discrimination, allowing an ease of engagement which was
otherwise not available. This illustrates empowering potential of
the Web, where the ability to control information about oneself
can be a positive force for good.
Another observation from our study relates to how platform
restrictions become barriers to the kinds of activities we de-
scribed. Platforms can limit control over identity accidentally or
deliberately, through policy or by constraining the affordances
provided. In particular, it is clear that several of the deception
strategies described were deployed in order to preserve safety,
privacy, or separation of identities in the face of platforms that
were designed to thwart such separation and/or anonymous
use. Common examples include providing false attributes to
platforms that required personal info “it had no business asking
for”and creating separate identities where platforms provided no
means of opting out of advertising or tracking. Perhaps the most
irksome to the participants of our study was the consolidation
of YouTube and Google+ identity namespaces with the intro-
duction of policies requiring the use of real names. Opposition
to this policy gathered over 240,000 signatures in a petition in
2013 when the change was made [15], indicating the widespread
desire to maintain separate, controllable identities. Examples
of careful and deliberate control over public profile information
on YouTube are documented by Guy et al. [18], showing that
strategies for persona management continue despite attempts
by Google to reduce the fluidity of identities of their users.
While it is apparent that many of the deceptions discussed
are neither new nor malicious, and complement or mirror pre-
Web forms of social mediation, we do not suggest that all such
activities were wholesome or innocent. Responses in the soceng
category included creating fake accounts to stalk an ex-partner
or to test the faithfulness of a current one; gaining trust to see
what people were saying about them behind their backs; and
manipulating social situations for personal advantage. Addi-
tionally, several respondents admitted to manipulating technical
systems, to gain access to protected resources in games, access
age-restricted content and so on.
In addition to the behaviours here, there are many malicious
or undesirable behaviours which were not reported in our study,
but which are facilitated by the ability to create and alter identi-
ties. Astroturfing [13, e.g.] has become common online [43], with
corporations and governments employing sophisticated identity
management software to carry out large scale operations. Possi-
bly the most famous of this is the “50 Cent Party”, hired by the
government of the People’s Republic of China to post favourable
comments towards party policy [40]. On a smaller scale, sock-
puppets – multiple accounts controlled by a single person – are
used to skew ideas of consensus and distort discussion in online
societies, leading to attempts to automatically identify such
accounts [6, 34]. Personas can be constructed for the purpose of
trolling, whether it is overtly offensive in order to cause outrage
or more subtle manipulation to trick people into wasting effort or
taking caricatured positions, and correlations have been shown
between enjoyment of trolling and everyday sadism [7].
Many of these activities are a form of obfuscation, in some way
hiding the truth, polluting the data pool and diminishing trust.
The ethical issues here are complex and contextual, with the
viewpoints of different actors having considerable divergence [5].
However, we contend that the great majority of the – admittedly
self-reported – lies detailed here were carried out for justifiable,
defensible reasons, which contribute to the richness and vitality
of the online social fabric.
6. LIMITATIONS
Among the limitations of the study, first, the self-report of ly-
ing behaviours may be different from actual practices for several
reasons; retrospective bias effects may cause consistent under-
reporting (e.g. “I think I am a mostly honest person, therefore I
really must not lie that much”). A second reason that self-report
is challenging here is that, due to the degree to which lying prac-
tices may be ingrained, there may be classes of behaviours that
people may not consider, realise or think of as lying or deception
at all. Indeed, a major class of butler lies were not even perceived
as lies by participants of prior study [19]. In order to mitigate this
effect, we iterated on the wording of the survey questions to try
to elicit as wide a variety of relevant behaviours as possible. Sec-
ond, as with all surveys, selection-bias effects may have affected
the results; in particular, those that volunteered (or, indeed, took
any notice to begin with), were perhaps more likely than not
to have a pre-existing interest in topics. This may have biased
results towards those with opinions or thoughts on the topic.
Another limitation of this study is that it is reflective of only
one specific demographic that we targeted; young, Western,
social media enthusiasts comprising YouTubers and other “web
nerds”, as these individuals have been shown to have complex,
entangled online social lives [4, 28, 26, 27, 29]. As such, the
kinds of concerns and experiences people reported may not be
representative of other Web demographics; for example, some
demographics may be less likely to maintain separate fictional
personae online, or have any need to keep separate their so-
cial media fanbases. However, studies of specific online groups,
such as gamers on MMORPGs [41] have demonstrated that
demographics were considerably more diverse than previously
suggested, particularly in specialised online communities [12].
To find out more about other groups, we plan to survey attitudes
and practices of other demographics in follow-up work.
Finally, this study is an exploration of the kinds of untruthful
practices carried out rather than an attempt to rigorously de-
termine how often they are used. As such, we have not leaned
heavily on any quantitative analysis – frequency counts have been
used as an organising principle rather than a means of compar-
ison or a fundamental part of our claims. Realistically estimat-
ing the frequency of actual lying and deception practice online
presents significant methodological challenges, and, as a result, is
out of our research priority for the immediate forseeable future.
7. CONCLUSIONS & FUTUREWORK
In summary, this study found that people self-reported many
routine kinds of lying, deception and omission strategies, reflect-
ing a variety of needs and coping strategies for sustaining healthy,
safe, and fun social interactions online. Only a small proportion
of responses found deliberate attempts to socially manipulate
others, while the vast majority corresponded to instances of
trying to make oneself look good, maintaining separation among
one’s personal, professional and other social roles, fit in with
others, avoid harassment, avoid causing others’ worry, and to
protect themselves from potentially harmful violations of privacy.
In immediate ongoing work, we are expanding our analysis to
the other questions to identify platform- and demographic- dif-
ferences in lying and deception practices. For example, despite
not asking about platforms in q4 or q5, many participants men-
tioned adopting behaviours for specific platforms, for example,
to separate their “intimate” content on Tumblr, or to mitigate
potential privacy concerns with trolls on Reddit or YouTube.
Longer term, we wish to further develop our taxonomy of lying,
omission and deception behaviours in order to translate the
needs they imply into implications for the design of platforms
for future Web communities.
The fact that users must take active steps to circumvent the
default behaviour of systems to maintain their online presence(s)
suggests that current social media platforms have some way
to go to provide a service that sufficiently affords the complex
self-representation needs of users. The variety of benign and
positive reasons users had for creating mistruths indicates that
these representations should be supported in order to maintain
vibrant online spaces.
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